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The contingency of cheese
On Fredric Jameson’s The Antinomies of Realism 
david cunningham
Fredric Jameson has been a busy man over the last 
decade. As well as two massive tomes on science 
fiction and modernism, combining republished essays 
with extensive new material, there has been a trilogy 
of books on Hegel and Marx which have sought 
to defend dialectical thinking from its discontents 
both internal and external to the Marxian tradition, 
amounting to a late burst of productivity that threat-
ens to put if not Stakhanov then at least Slavoj ŽiŽek 
to shame. For the most part these books have tended 
to focus on the reiteration of already fairly well estab-
lished theoretical claims. However, Jameson’s latest, 
The Antinomies of Realism, looks like something rather 
newer.*
The book is, if nothing else, timely, appearing in 
the context of a resurgence of both practices and 
discourses of ‘realism’ across the arts, from the much-
celebrated tele-roman The Wire (about which Jameson 
has written elsewhere) to the late Allan Sekula’s pho-
tographic epics to, say, Lav Diaz’s extraordinary four-
hour film of Filipino urban life and global capitalism, 
Norte, The End of History – in what I have described 
previously as a remobilization under changed histori-
cal circumstances of the totalizing and ‘connecting 
values of realism’.1 Jameson makes little explicit allu-
sion to such contemporary instances – for reasons 
that can no doubt be related to his unwillingness 
to relinquish that personal albatross which is the 
concept of postmodernity – and, apart from a final 
chapter on the historical novel and one brief excur-
sus on Alexander Kluge, The Antinomies of Realism 
sticks pretty resolutely to the nineteenth century. 
Nonetheless, in terms of a contemporary academic 
discourse on realism, the book can certainly be read 
as a contribution to a wider attempt to begin undoing 
a caricatured ‘straw man’ version of the form and its 
association with a simple referential naivety – the 
transparent window on a stable world marshalled by 
some Führer-like ‘omniscient narrator’ – popularized 
in literary theory by the likes of Catherine Belsey and 
Colin MacCabe.2 
Of course, if the most famous of Jameson’s exist-
ing problematics – postmodernism – was explicitly 
construed as a third, successive term to realism and 
modernism, then there is an evident logic in the 
writing of a big book on realism that would follow 
on from the work on postmodernism of the 1980s 
and 1990s, and the subsequent rereadings of modern-
ism in the last decade: A Singular Modernity (2002) 
and The Modernist Papers (2007). More importantly, 
precisely as a hitherto ‘absent term’, it is this first 
moment that has, I think, often implicitly appeared 
to provide the principal frame for marking out a story 
of progressive loss in Jameson’s work. Realism, which 
still imagined (however mythically or precariously) 
that it could access some ‘perspective of totality’, and 
which was marked – as in its Urtext Don Quixote – by 
‘the emergence of the secular referent’, is displaced in 
turn, first, by modernism (which experiences the loss 
of such totality and concreteness as loss, and hence as 
tragedy or avant-garde possibility) and then by post-
modernism (for which ‘the modernization process is 
complete and nature is gone for good’). Among other 
things, this tripartite narrative has had the advantage 
of placing Jameson’s own work within an eminent 
lineage, as the apparently rightful successor to 
Lukács and Adorno – the great theorists of ‘realism’ 
and ‘modernism’, respectively – while, at the same 
time, aligning all three with his notorious period-
ization of the three ‘stages’ of capitalism adapted 
from Ernest Mandel’s 1972 book Late Capitalism. If 
postmodernism is thus, according to such a schema, 
the cultural logic of ‘late capitalism’, realism would 
equate to a ‘classical or market capitalism’ – albeit at a 
fairly late moment – which will, Jameson writes in the 
Postmodernism book, ‘probably not involve problems 
of figuration so acute as those we will confront in the 
later stages’. Indeed, such problems will ‘only become 
* Fredric Jameson, The Antinomies of Realism, Verso, London and New York, 2013. 326 pp., £20.00 hb., 978 1 78168 133 6. Page references to 
this edition appear in the main text.
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visible in the next stage’ of modernism/monopoly 
capitalism, in what he defines precisely as a ‘crisis 
in realism’ generated by the ‘gap between individual 
and phenomenological experience and structural 
intelligibility’ present within an expanding imperial 
system and metropolitan life.3
Since the 1970s, Jameson has done his best to 
purge his work of the more straightforwardly human-
istic tone that his articulation of these intensifying 
‘problems of figuration’ sometimes had in his early 
Marxism and Form, where the loss of some true 
‘feeling of concreteness, of filled density of being’, 
and ‘our inability to realize the Hegelian vision of 
totality’, is presented as ‘a judgement on us and on 
the moment of history in which we live’.4 But the 
underlying force of the periodizations proposed have 
remained firmly rooted in Lukács’s assertion that 
whatever ‘loss’ might be at stake here finds its source 
not in ‘authors’ fundamental intentions’, but in ‘the 
given historico-philosophical realities with which the 
authors were confronted’.5 So, for instance, the his-
torical novel – to which Jameson returns in the final 
chapter of The Antinomies of Realism – will become 
a progressively impossible genre in the course of the 
twentieth century by virtue of a growing incapacity 
to access ‘the retrospective dimension indispensable 
to any vital reorientation of our collective future’, 
but as such will also, in a text like E.L. Doctorow’s 
Ragtime (1975), register, in new artistic ways, the more 
general loss of the historical ‘referent’ and its dissolu-
tion into some ‘vast collection of images’.6
That a certain ‘realism’ remains something of a 
necessary yardstick against which to get the measure 
of subsequent historical developments is fairly clear 
here; as it is, for example, in Jameson’s influential 
notion of an ‘aesthetic of cognitive mapping’, which 
names the equally ‘impossible’ attempt to over-
come, from within (post)modernity, the profound 
gap between ‘the local positioning of the individual 
subject’ and the totality of economic and class struc-
tures in which such a subject is situated.7 For, as I 
have argued elsewhere, although Jameson tends to 
focus the discussion on architecture or film, its most 
evident kinship lies with the problem of the novel as 
impossible ‘epic’ form as it is set out in Lukács’s The 
Theory of the Novel, and to which Lukács’s own later 
work on realism was partly intended as a revisionary 
response.8 
The first surprise in Antinomies of Realism is, there-
fore, that this ‘epic’ conception of realism – tied, 
as it is, to a commitment to a concept of totality, 
of which perhaps Jameson has been the principal 
proponent within anglophone Marxism – should 
appear to play such a marginal role within the book; 
at least until its second half, where Jameson turns 
to the more canonically epic forms of war narrative 
and the historical novel, and even there often only 
in oblique fashion. (Indeed, as we shall see, Balzac, 
commonly thought of, not least by Lukács, as the 
greatest embodiment of such a novelistic ‘will to 
totality’, is largely consigned to a kind of prehistory of 
those antinomies of realism with which this new text 
is concerned.) The association of realism with some 
form of explanatory power or grasp of social truth, 
dear to much of the Marxist tradition – but now, no 
doubt, perceived as rather too mired in antiquated 
political debates – is conspicuous by its absence. 
If, then, The Antinomies of Realism often reads 
like an idiosyncratically structuralist book of sorts, 
as much as a discernibly Marxist one, the specific 
‘diachronic’ analysis offered in the book’s first half 
focuses not on questions of totality, but principally on 
nineteenth-century realism’s self-destructive internal 
tensions, in such a way as (our second surprise) to 
reconceive it as closer to a kind of modernism-in-the-
making. Far from a moment of stability of meaning 
against which later developments might be histori-
cally judged, realism appears here, instead, as already 
– to borrow a phrase from Jay Bernstein – ‘an art 
bound to its own impossibility’.9
the affective turn
The Antinomies of Realism is divided into two parts, 
with introduction but no conclusion, the second of 
which is presented as three more or less discrete 
essays. The central proposition underpinning the 
critical readings of the first section, which accounts 
for about two-thirds of the book, is that nineteenth-
century realism is best understood as the dialectical 
production of a precarious and historically specific 
tension between two interwoven forms and modalities 
of time: on the one hand, ‘story’ or ‘narration’ – or, 
more precisely, ‘the French récit’, which foregrounds 
‘the telling of the tale as such’ (10) – and, on the other, 
what is defined at various points as the ‘descrip-
tive’ or ‘the scenic’, but which most often, and most 
strikingly, is referred to as affect. While the former 
continues to extend a tradition of narrative form that 
includes folktales, ‘ballads and broadsheets’, diaries 
and letters, and the existing history of the novel itself 
(8), and that retains a force in the twin ‘menaces’ of 
melodrama and the Bildungsroman (fascinatingly 
tackled in the book’s seventh chapter on ‘the dis-
solution of genre’), the latter appears, according to 
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Jameson, as some historically new (and newly dis-
ruptive) element that, foregrounding the affective, 
introduces a heterogeneous and expanded present 
that continually breaks apart the chronological tem-
porality in which récit is unfolded – an ‘insurrection’, 
as Jameson puts it, borrowing a phrase from Kluge, 
‘of the present against the other temporalities’ (10): 
What we call realism will thus come into being in 
the symbiosis of this pure form of storytelling with 
impulses of scenic elaboration, description and 
above all affective investment, which allow it to 
develop towards a scenic present which in reality, 
but secretly, abhors the other temporalities which 
constitute the force of the tale or récit in the first 
place. (11)
It is the ineliminable revolt of these new impulses 
against the will to meaningful shape found in the 
récit that will thus make realism, for Jameson, an 
inherently unstable form from its beginning, ‘whose 
emergence and development at one and the same 
time constitute its own inevitable undoing’ (6).
Bookended by two initial chapters attempting to 
theorize the distinct poles of realism’s antinomy, 
and two chapters which chart its disintegration into 
the ‘swollen or blank unidentified third person’ (by 
way of style indirect libre or Henry James’s ‘point of 
view’) (174), the book pursues a series of four case 
studies, beginning with a chapter on Zola and ‘the 
codification of affect’, in which it is argued that, 
by contrast to Balzac or Stendhal, Zola introduces 
into the novel a new ‘autonomization of the sensory’ 
(55). Subsequently, Jameson’s dialectic is developed 
through readings of Tolstoy, where the antinomies 
of narration and affect are played out in a tension 
between ‘plot’ and ‘scene’; the Spanish novelist Pérez 
Galdós, in which this develops into ‘a deterioration of 
protagonicity’, whereby what might once have been 
thought the digressions of sub-plots involving ‘minor’ 
characters’ gradually come to take over the fore-
ground of the novel (96); and, finally, George Eliot, 
in a rather brilliant reading concerning the ways in 
which her novels undo the generic constraints of 
melodrama through the dissolution of its central cat-
egory of ‘evil’ into affect’s ‘present of consciousness’, 
which may know ‘bad faith’ but cannot experience 
itself as being ‘evil’ as such.
As always, Jameson is an immensely impressive 
close reader. However, it is fair to say that the over-
riding emphasis on affect in theorizing and knitting 
all of this together appears as something of a sur-
prise. Much of Jameson’s initial reputation derived, 
in the early 1970s, from his critical mediation of 
new European theoretical trends, from Sartre and 
German Critical Theory to Russian formalism and 
French structuralism. This was followed by the 
work on ‘postmodernism’, which sought, in part, to 
historicize various strands of contemporary French 
‘poststructuralist’ theory (Lacan, Deleuze, Lyotard, 
Baudrillard) as representative of a ‘cultural logic of 
late capitalism’ still best understood in Hegelian-
Marxist terms; that is, through the maintaining of 
a dialectical conception of totality against which 
those very same theorists had framed their work. 
This strategy of incorporating often very different 
theoretical idioms, not so much through critique as 
through their ‘translation’ into other, more amena-
ble registers, is one to which Jameson has broadly 
remained faithful since.10 Still, Jameson’s recourse 
to the terminology of affect theory may be his most 
ambitious attempt at such ‘transcoding’ to date. 
The use to which Jameson puts this in The Anti-
nomies of Realism is most clearly unfolded in the Zola 
chapter, which implicitly draws upon a dominant 
contemporary association of the ‘affective’ with a 
turn away from the various linguistic and semiotic 
paradigms of structuralism and post-structuralism, 
but which is here historicized in terms of ‘the 
emergence of nameless bodily states which can be 
documented in literature around the middle of the 
nineteenth century’. In this Second Empire or Vic-
torian affective turn, Jameson writes, the body thus 
comes to be ‘opposed’ not only to allegory or symbol 
but to language as such (32). While Jameson suggests 
that Flaubert and Baudelaire ‘can stand as markers 
for such a transformation of the sensorium’ (32), it is 
in Zola, and particularly in La Ventre de Paris (1873), 
set in the Parisian market of Les Halles, that an 
‘excess of the sensory becomes autonomous; that is 
to say, it begins to have enough weight of its own to 
counterbalance the plot’ (50). This is a process which 
‘ultimately tends to release its sensory material from 
any specific viewer or individual human subject, from 
any specific character to whom the function of obser-
vation has been assigned’ (56), in what, I guess, we 
might understand as a momentary affinity of subject 
and object. This is exemplified in the celebrated 
‘symphony of cheeses’, which, despite its rather half-
hearted framing in the novel as some metaphor for 
the rancid gossip of two female characters, opens up 
– with its eighteen varieties of cheese described over 
several pages – onto what Jameson terms a ‘liberation 
from meaning’ in which affect, freeing itself from 
any narrative motive, acquires its ‘own temporality’ 
of a massively extended and ‘impersonal’ present (64).
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There is a somewhat obvious, if slightly facile, 
objection to such propositions – nonetheless tricky 
to negotiate for all affect theory – that, as somehow 
‘liberated from meaning’, in its gesture towards some 
separation from language or the sign, all affect still 
has to be, at some level, rendered ‘meaningful’ in 
order to be intelligible at all. Indeed Jameson himself 
makes something like this point in an earlier reading 
of the ‘affective content’ of Baudelaire’s ‘Chant 
d’automne’, in an essay originally published in 1985 
and repackaged in 2007’s The Modernist Papers, which 
notes how the poem’s ‘feeling of some kind, strong 
and articulated, yet necessarily nameless’ in becom-
ing ‘transmuted into a verbal text … ceases to be … 
affective in any sense of the word’: ‘The problem … is 
that language never ceases to attempt to reabsorb and 
recontain contingency … it always seems to trans-
form that scandalous and irreducible content back 
into something like meaning.’11 I will come back to 
this reading in a moment – and to the identification 
of ‘affect’ and ‘contingency’ that it entails – but it 
is fair to say that Jameson deals with this dilemma 
primarily by insisting that, in literature at least, affect 
can thus precisely only ever be thought dia-
lectically. Indeed, this will be a central plank 
in the book’s larger endeavour to reaffirm the 
validity of dialectical thought in general.
One way of understanding Jameson’s own 
privileging of ‘the realm of affect’ is in the 
context of a certain argument with Lukács’s 
account of realism, which often appears to 
be going on, subterraneously, throughout 
the book without ever coming into focus as 
such. As is well known, the latter’s strident 
separation of Balzacian ‘realism’ from Zola’s 
‘naturalism’ took much of its inspiration from 
an 1888 letter by Engels in which he dismisses 
‘all the Zolas  passés, présents et à venir’ when meas-
ured against the ‘realistic history of French “society”’ 
provided by Balzac (cited 270). This is extended by 
Lukács into a distinction between narration and 
description, first proposed in an essay published in 
the 1930s, where Zola’s ‘obsession with monographic 
detail’ is contrasted with the capacity of Balzac’s 
novels to make us ‘experience events which are 
inherently significant … because of the general social 
significance emerging in the unfolding of the charac-
ters’ lives’. As he puts it, in what is in this context an 
evidently resonant phrase: description ‘contemporizes 
everything’, rendering the world as ‘a series of static 
pictures’ or ‘still lives’.12 If the chapter on Zola stands 
out in The Antinomies of Realism, it is in part, then, 
because of the evident attempt to redeem him from 
Lukács critical judgement. 
At the same time, in substituting ‘affect’ for 
‘description’ as the privileged term – or, more accu-
rately, in effectively running the two together – part, 
I suspect, of what Jameson is also seeking to do here 
is to complicate what he, elsewhere in the book, sug-
gests is an almost axiomatically conservative bent in 
all realisms – ‘a vested interest, an ontological stake, 
in the solidity of [bourgeois] social reality’ (5) – to 
which the ‘affective’ might offer some strange resist-
ance. (It is noticeable, if so, how close this comes to 
effectively reversing Lukács’s argument vis-à-vis narra-
tion and description.) This would be Jameson’s more 
socially concrete version of the Barthesian argument 
regarding the readerly text, or, for example, Lyotard’s 
claim that, in seeking to ‘stabilize the referent’, real-
ists can only come to be ‘apologists of what exists’.13 
Jameson’s rewrite of this would then see in realism’s 
very origins that force which will, in opening up 
onto a new ‘present of consciousness’, finally escape 
the control of ‘narrative’, and ultimately result in the 
torn halves of modernism and mass market fiction.
Such a split is a fairly familiar theme in Jame-
son’s work. Still, it is not always clear exactly what, 
in the case of realism, the dialectical opposite of 
affect actually is. The above would certainly suggest 
‘narrative’. But most directly – if most briefly – the 
‘bodily feeling’ of affect is also opposed, following Rei 
Terada, to ‘emotions’, which are on Jameson’s account 
always ‘named’, and hence semiotically systematized 
(32). In the 1985 reading of Baudelaire’s poetry, this 
was the point at which ‘nameless’ feeling ‘becomes 
lost to the older psychological lexicon (full of names 
for states of mind we recognize in advance)’. The key 
proposition seems to be then that, as named, such 
feelings are effectively reified. This is one way in 
which an ‘ontological stake’ in the ‘solidity of social 
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reality’ is manifested (5). Affect becomes an imma-
nent form of dialectical resistance to such reification 
and, consequently, the indicator of a commitment to 
the ‘new’ (experience) as a moment of non-identity 
or singularity which is, by definition, not-yet-named. 
The larger historical claim underlying this is one set 
out more explicitly in the essay on Baudelaire where 
Jameson proposes what he describes as ‘an outra-
geous … generalization, namely that before Baude-
laire and Flaubert there are no physical sensations in 
literature’. Or, as he puts elsewhere in the same essay, 
it is only in such mid-nineteenth-century writers that 
we find ‘the simultaneous production and effacement 
of the referent itself … grasped as what is outside of 
language, what language or a certain configuration 
of language seems to designate, and yet, in the very 
moment of indication, to project beyond its own 
reach’. Here the referent is, in fact, ‘simply the body 
itself … [or] sensation’.14
The first sign of trouble to note in this historical 
periodization is that, in the essay from the mid-1980s, 
this is explicitly designated not as the moment of 
realism but instead as ‘the historical situation … of 
nascent high modernism’; high modernism presum-
ably constituting something like the cultural logic 
of so-called ‘high capitalism’, rather than, as yet, 
‘monopoly capitalism’ (Jameson’s second ‘stage’).15 The 
second is that where, in this earlier essay, Jameson 
thus already rehearses his (anti-Lukácsian Lukác-
sian) argument concerning Balzac’s distance from 
such ‘free-floating bodily perception’, it is precisely, if 
implicitly, because of the latter’s identification with a 
now-already-waning form of ‘realism’. In such terms, 
Balzac is, as Jameson wrote in 1985, representative of 
an earlier ‘historical situation’ in which 
even where we are confronted with what look 
like masses of sense data – … [as in] Balzac, with 
his elaborate descriptions, that include the very 
smell of his rooms – those apparently perceptual 
notations, on closer examination, prove to be so 
many signs. In the older rhetorical apparatus, in 
other words, ‘physical sensation’ does not meet the 
opacity of the body, but is secretly transparent, 
and always means something else – moral qualities, 
financial or social status, and so forth.16
In The Antinomies of Realism, this argument – heavily 
indebted to Auerbach17 – becomes the claim (in a 
reading of the description of the boarding house in Le 
Père Goriot, 1834), that what ‘looks like a physical sen-
sation’ is actually ‘already a meaning, an allegory’: the 
‘description is not the evocation of an affect, for one 
good reason: namely that it means something’ (33).18 
La modernité 
My point is not to show that what seems new in The 
Antinomies of Realism in fact reiterates (if deepens 
considerably) arguments first made by Jameson 
some thirty years ago. Rather, what is interesting 
is the slippage surrounding the distinction between 
realism and modernism, and the relation of both to 
‘modernity’, which this apparent break with Balzac’s 
‘meaning’ involves. Immediately following his Auer-
bachian interpretation of Le Père Goriot, Jameson 
cites Barthes’s insistence, in ‘The Reality Effect’, upon 
‘the irreconcilable divorce between lived experience 
and the intelligible which characterizes modernity’ 
(33). ‘Experience – and sensory experience in par-
ticular – is’, Jameson continues, ‘in modern times 
contingent: if such experience has a meaning, we 
are at once suspicious of its authenticity’ (34). (In 
contrast stands Lukács’s rather torturous attempt to 
find in realism an epic ‘elevation’ of ‘chance to the 
inevitable’.19) The larger context for this specifically 
modern sense of ‘contingency’ would be Barthes’s 
influential account of the effective codification of 
novelistic form in what he calls ‘the great storytellers 
of the nineteenth century’ through their adoption 
of the récit. This is the basis for Barthes’s famous 
analysis of the passé simple, which ‘supposes a world 
which is constructed, elaborated, detached … not 
a world which is thrown, displayed, offered [jeté, 
étalé, offert]’, and in which actions are ‘freed of the 
trembling of existence’, having ‘the stability and the 
pattern of an algebra’: ‘the world may be filled with 
pathos, but it is not abandoned, since it is a cluster 
of coherent relations.’ (Or, to paraphrase Nietzsche’s 
overfamiliar quip, realism may have killed God, but 
it failed to kill grammar.) As Barthes concludes, the 
passé simple ‘reassures’ us as to the ‘possibility of 
communication’: ‘The récit has a name, it escapes the 
terror of a speech without limits.’20 Here, then, we 
perhaps find one explanation for Jameson’s focus on 
the named ‘emotion’.
If the resistance of affect to narrative propulsion is 
also the ‘resistance of affect to language’, as Jameson 
suggests, it necessarily poses ‘new representational 
tasks … in the effort somehow to seize its fleeting 
essence’ (31; my emphasis). But a slightly crude ques-
tion would then be: why not simply call this affective 
revolt of the present ‘modernity’: la modernité – ‘the 
transitory, the fugitive, the contingent’?21 In many 
respects, this would seem to best reflect – better than 
‘affect’ at any rate – a certain, specifically French 
confusion of the historical coordinates of realism and 
modernism more generally, given their overlap in the 
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standard pedagogical periodization of these terms 
around the late 1840s–1870s, in the era of Baudelaire, 
Manet, Flaubert, Zola and Lautréamont, and in the 
‘disenchanted world’ of Marx’s ‘all that is holy is 
profaned’ or Baudelaire’s ‘loss of a halo’.22
In his book The Modern Epic, Franco Moretti 
makes the intriguing suggestion that if what we 
tend to call ‘modernism is really just a chapter in 
the far broader history of Western modernity’, what 
delayed its full flowering was above all the form of 
the novel ‘as perhaps not exactly a conservative, but 
certainly a moderating, form: as a symbolic brake 
upon modernity’. Moretti’s own chief example is 
the Bildungsroman, but the point presumably holds 
for the mainstream of classic nineteenth-century 
realism also.23 This is why eighteenth-century novels 
like Tristram Shandy or Jacques le fataliste can often 
seem more ‘modern(ist)’ than anything written in the 
century after.24 A similar point is suggested in Gabriel 
Josipovici’s more recent analysis of the ‘naiveté’ (in 
the Schillerian sense) of Balzac and Dickens, which 
finds (too simplistically, I think) the ‘root of their 
strength’ and ‘magisterial authority’ in their inabil-
ity or unwillingness to ‘question what it is they are 
doing’, by contrast to a properly ‘modernist’ doubt 
about ‘imposing a shape on [the world] and giving it 
a meaning that it doesn’t have’.25 Realism is, in this 
sense, as Bernstein says, less ‘a matter of making 
likenesses of the world’ as it is ‘a complex matter of 
the fitness of the wholly human powers of art in rela-
tion to a particular, wholly human and secular social 
world’. It is the ‘lack of fit that makes modernism 
necessary’, but also makes it ‘an art of failure’.26
But this would then be itself the substance of 
Jameson’s point that realism’s only ultimate outcome 
could be to destroy ‘realism’ itself. In contriving some 
delicate dialectical balance between narrative coher-
ence and contingency, so as to put in place a new set 
of precarious conventions for the novel, it can only 
finally confront the contingent (or arbitrary) nature 
of these conventions themselves, which thus come 
to seem necessarily ‘unrealistic’: ‘realism’s ultimate 
adversary will be the realistic novel itself ’ (162). This 
is why so many familiar ‘modernist’ critiques of 
realism, from Woolf to Gide to Beckett, turn on the 
accusation that in giving coherence to a finally ‘inco-
herent’ reality it is precisely not realistic enough.27 
The major rationale, I think, for The Antinomies of 
Realism’s privileging of ‘affect’ is the way it thus pre-
cisely reconnects realism with modernism, and with a 
broader question of contingency.28 Oddly enough, in 
thus placing the likes of Balzac outside the picture, 
at some level this repeats Lukács himself, since the 
latter’s critique of Zola’s and Flaubert’s ‘naturalism’ 
rests precisely on its continuity with modernism 
(particularly Joyce and Dos Passos), as opposed to 
with realism proper. This may be one reason why, as 
Jameson notes in passing in the Postmodernism book, 
naturalism has ‘always presented peculiar problems 
for literary history’.29 These are problems, however, 
that Jameson brackets here by simply reabsorbing 
them into ‘realism’ itself.
Yet if realism is connected to modernism around a 
shared problem of contingency, it is hard not to think 
that ‘affect’ would thus be, at best, most plausibly 
thought of as one particular manifestation, or ‘type’, 
of such a problem, rather than its master term. It is 
here that the broader Hegelian-Lukácsian account of 
the novel as impossible epic of a modern bourgeois or 
capitalist ‘world of prose’ – a ‘world of finitude and 
mutability, of entanglement in the relative … from 
which the individual is in no position to withdraw’30 
– seems most clearly to reassert itself. (The long and 
difficult section on immanence and transcendence, 
which begins the second half of the book, appears to 
be designed, in part, to grapple with this.) If ‘Episch 
is immanent, in the sense that meaning is inherent 
in all objects and details, all its facts, all its events’ 
(210–11), then contingency marks the loss of such 
capacity to presume that reality ‘has its meaning, its 
deeper reason for being, within itself ’. This is what 
the early Lukács termed (negatively) ‘transcendental 
homelessness’ or (more positively) the ‘productivity 
of spirit’.31 Auerbach’s similar comment on modernist 
writers, in the final chapter of Mimesis, that they 
‘hesitate to impose upon life, which is their subject, 
an order which it does not possess in itself ’ is, in 
this sense, crucially the ‘result’ of tensions internal 
to realism itself.32 And just as modernism can thus 
be brought closer to a certain realism, so Ulysses, for 
example, can be at least in part ‘interrogated with 
the categories and within the limits of realism’ (216). 
Problems of history
The disturbance of established periodizations in The 
Antinomies of Realism is not unproductive and, if 
nothing else, it provides yet another version of the 
familiar argument for which Flaubert, say, may be 
understood as realist, modernist and (if we must) 
postmodernist all at once (178). Going in the opposite 
direction this would, then, no doubt relate also to 
Jameson’s previous attempt to identify both a ‘mod-
ernist’ and a ‘postmodernist’ Baudelaire in the 1985 
essay from which I have already extensively quoted: 
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‘the Baudelaire inaugural poet of high modernism 
(of a today extinct high modernism, I would add), 
and the Baudelaire of postmodernism, of our own 
immediate age, of consumer society, the Baudelaire 
of the society of the spectacle or the image’.33 Yet, as 
Jameson brings realism closer to modernism, so the 
separation invoked here is a hard one to maintain. 
Indeed, the obvious problem with it is already identi-
fied, in fairly straightforward terms, by Moretti (in 
his chapter on ‘Ulysses and the Twentieth Century’ 
in The Modern Epic), which begins with a series of 
citations from Zola’s The Ladies’ Paradise: ‘All true’, as 
Moretti puts it of Jameson’s celebrated analysis of the 
Bonaventura, ‘apart from the novelty of the thing … 
in this – as, perhaps, in everything – the postmodern 
is just one more step along a route traced long ago … 
it was already like that in Zola’: ‘does the mismatch 
between subject and object really begin with post-
modern hyperspace … [or] Zola’s department store?’34 
There is little need to run through, yet again, these 
arguments concerning the ‘periodizing hypothesis’ of 
the postmodern, which have long since passed their 
sell-by date; although we might wonder, as Peter 
Osborne recently has, if, like modernism or modernity, 
the era of ‘high capitalism’ is thus quite so ‘extinct’ as 
might be supposed.35 Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that, apparently unlike ‘postmodernism’, realism and 
modernism can only ever be said, both of them, to 
belong to ‘modernity’; something which evidently 
causes Jameson more than a few dilemmas. Of course, 
for many of us, the most sensible conclusion is then 
simply ‘to admit that modernity is inescapable and 
to desist from speculations about [its] end’.36 The 
point is not a new one. Still, if Jameson’s dialectic 
of realism is indeed some belated acknowledgement 
that things were, at least in some degree, ‘already like 
that in Zola’ – that we are dealing here with forms of 
intensification and expansion rather than of epochal 
breaks – this suggests some largely unacknowledged 
effect of retroactivity in the privileging of the term 
‘affect’, in which it is only ‘now’ that its centrality to 
the novel of the second half of the nineteenth century 
can become historically intelligible. Something like 
this seems to be tacitly recognized in the book’s 
second chapter, in which Jameson recalls his own 
association of postmodernism with a ‘contemporary 
or postmodern “perpetual present”’ which is, he now 
suggests, ‘better characterized as a “reduction to the 
body”’: the ‘isolated body begins to know more global 
waves of generalized sensations, and it is these which, 
for want of a better word, I will here call affect’ (28). 
No doubt this incorporates a point about the rationale 
for some contemporary ‘affective turn’ itself (although 
it also seems to me to risk reinscribing a rather tra-
ditional mind–body dualism). But it simultaneously 
opens up some odd historical wormhole in Jameson’s 
familiar account of (post)modernity as a world of 
surfaces, libidinal intensities and the lived experience 
of a ‘perpetual present’. The ‘delirious multiplicity’ of 
Zola’s ‘meaningless’ cheeses (62) certainly sounds a 
lot like the Jamesonian postmodern in this respect. 
All of this might help to explain the most striking 
aporia of all in The Antinomies of Realism, which 
is the lack of any solid account of why exactly this 
historical ‘affective turn’ takes place when it does. 
It is, Jameson writes early on in the book, ‘towards 
mid-century, let us say in the 1840s of the bourgeois 
era, that such linguistic demands begin to become 
audible and inescapable, at least for the most alert 
arts that scan the era for the new’ (31). But why? 
Every ‘form’, Lukács asserts, ‘is the resolution of a 
fundamental dissonance of existence’.37 What, then, 
is the historically specific dissonance to which these 
‘antinomies of realism’ respond?
Lukács’s own canonical answer in ‘Narrate or 
Describe?’ revolved around the caesura of 1848: 
unlike Balzac or Stendhal, Zola and Flaubert ‘started 
their creative work after the June uprising in a firmly 
established bourgeois society’, in a historical situation 
in which an earlier claim of the bourgeois class to 
embody a universal emancipation had dissipated.38 
But this narrative of a loss of totalizing perspective 
plays no obvious role here; at least until the issue 
of collectivity – ‘the story of the Many rather than 
the One’ (222) – explicitly returns in the final two 
chapters on war and the historical novel. Instead, in 
line with the ‘autonomization of the sensory’ desig-
nated by affect, Jameson focuses on the role of what 
he designates ‘the “bourgeois body” … as it emerges 
from the outmoded classifications of the feudal era’ 
(32). This sounds a Foucauldian note, but it remains 
substantially undeveloped. Moreover, quite why this 
‘bourgeois body’ should emerge specifically around 
‘let us say … the 1840s’ is far from clear. 
One evident omission in this regard – which I 
have, unfortunately, insufficient space to write about 
here – is any explicit mention of photography in 
Jameson’s account of the development of realism. The 
Antinomies of Realism does make a convincing link to 
developments in painting of the period, noting not 
only the ‘painterly eye’ deployed in Zola (56) but its 
correlation to the way in which ‘time’ is ‘famously 
eternalized in Monet’s impressionism’ (41). (There 
is an interesting critical engagement with Michael 
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Fried’s work on nineteenth-century painting, and its 
ideas of instantaneousness, presence and theatrical-
ity, going on at various points.) However, if what is in 
question in the 1840s and after are ‘the most alert arts 
that scan the era for the new’ (31), one might certainly 
expect this ‘new’ to include the most radical trans-
formations of the era in modes of ‘representation’ 
and image production. Yet, the parallel suggested by 
Paul Valéry, in a celebrated 1939 talk, between the 
emergence of photography and the ‘descriptive genre’ 
of realism – developed in the recent work of Nancy 
Armstrong and Jennifer Green-Lewis – is one that 
Jameson follows Lukács in ignoring.39 The passing 
comment that ‘in contemporary stories objects 
tend to be far more contingent, resembling Barthes’ 
punctum more than they do his studium’ (23), suggests 
a different avenue might have been taken here.40 
To think further about what is at stake in the 
vaguely identified moment of ‘let us say in the 1840s’, 
one might start by considering, alongside Jameson’s 
reading of The Belly of Paris, two rather different 
analyses of Zola. The first would come from Auer-
bach’s reading of Germinal (1888). Here Auerbach 
focuses on Zola’s description of a working-class ‘ball’ 
at the end of a weekend. (The passage runs over 
two pages in Mimesis.) Like Jameson (and Lukács), 
Auerbach emphasizes the ‘purely sensory aspects’ of 
Zola’s ‘literary portrait’, which ‘reveals a decidedly 
pictorial vein’: ‘The flowing beer, the haze of sweat, 
the grinning and wide-open mouths likewise become 
visual impressions; acoustic and other sensory effects 
are also produced’. Yet, if there is certainly contin-
gency here – Hegel’s ‘prose of the world’ – as well as 
a pictorial temporality and ‘sensory immediacy’, it is 
not exactly meaningless in the sense in which Jameson 
seems to understand the purely bodily ‘affect’. For, as 
Auerbach asks,
What sort of an orgy is it which reaches its end 
so early? [The passage begins ‘It was ten o’clock 
before anyone left’.] The coal miners have to be out 
of bed early on Monday morning, some of them 
at four o’clock … And once we have paused, there 
are many other things that strike us. An orgy, even 
among the lowest classes, calls for plenty. And 
plenty there is, but it is poor and frugal – nothing 
but beer. The whole thing shows how desolate and 
miserable the joys of these people are. 
What is being described in this passage may, then, be 
‘unreservedly translated into sensory terms’ by Zola, 
but it is in the service of showing (rather than strictly 
‘telling’) a ‘desolate truth’ about, in this instance, 
proletarian life.41
The second passage comes from Zola’s The Ladies’ 
Paradise (1883), this time as cited in Moretti’s The 
Modern Epic: 
Nothing but white, and never the same white, 
every shade of white, heaped up on one another, 
contrasting with and complementing one another, 
until they merged into the brilliance of light itself. 
It began with the dull white of the calicos and hol-
lands, the flat white of the flannels and bedlinens; 
then came the velvets, the silks, the satins, in an 
ascending scale, the whiteness gradually catching 
fire to form little tongues of flame at the breaks of 
the folds; and with the transparency of the gauzes 
the white took flight, to become free radiance with 
the muslins, the guipures, the laces, and above all 
the tulles, so light that they were like the farthest, 
dying note, while the silver of the pieces of oriental 
silk sank higher than all in the recesses of the vast 
bay.42
Here, too, then we have the apparent autonomy 
of ‘sense data’, the proliferation of the (unnameably?) 
different whites that take flight, merge ‘into the bril-
liance of light itself ’, become ‘free radiance’. Yet, as 
Moretti points out, in this case such sensory ‘affect’ 
appears, far more directly, in the specific context of 
commodity display, in which, as he puts it, ‘a sheet is 
no longer a thing, but precisely a stimulus: a blinding, 
luminous ray’.43 As such, its very ‘meaninglessness’ 
itself acquires a kind of (social) meaning in its ‘aes-
thetic’ functions here. This encourages a rereading of 
the ‘symphony of cheeses’ passage, as one in which the 
very resistance to narrative ‘meaning’ that Jameson 
identifies also marks something of the sensuously 
invigorating accumulation of commodity goods, or 
the abstracting deterritorialization of rural produce 
sent to the metropolitan market and of a progressive 
incorporation into a regime of exchangeability. 
Realism on the basis of a loss of reality
In developing a more multidimensional and socially 
grounded account of realism than can be provided 
by the emergence of ‘affect’ alone – which risks 
becoming a loose signifier for all those forms of ‘non-
narrative’ time that occupy one side of Jameson’s 
various dichotomies – one possible direction is pro-
vided by a short essay on Balzac by Adorno published 
at the beginning of the 1960s. In a rephrasing of the 
opening to Benjamin’s 1936 ‘The Storyteller’ essay, 
Adorno argues that ‘It is precisely because in the 
bourgeois world one can no longer tell stories about 
the things that are decisive that storytelling is dying 
out.’ By apparent contrast, ‘Balzac brought society as 
totality, something classical political economy and 
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Hegelian philosophy had formulated in theoretical 
terms, down from the airy realm of ideas to the sphere 
of sensory evidence.’ However, in doing so, Adorno 
continues, he had to (re)produce such a totality ‘by no 
means only [as] an extensive totality … the physiology 
of life as a whole in its various branches’, but also as 
an ‘intensive totality’ in the form of a ‘functional 
complex’: ‘A dynamic rages in it: society reproduces 
itself only as a whole, in and through the system, 
and to do so it needs every last man as a customer.’ 
And the principal means of this self-reproduction is, 
Adorno argues, above all money, which, on the one 
hand, patterns the lives of all the characters in La 
Comédie humaine, and connects them together, but 
which, on the other, constitutes a ‘veil’ that Balzac 
is unable to ‘penetrate’. ‘The credit system links the 
fate of the one to the fate of the other, whether they 
know it or not.’ Yet how is the ‘credit system’ to be 
narrated? This is what Adorno terms Balzac’s strug-
gle to ‘conjure up in perceptible form’ a society that 
has, with ‘the irresistible ascendancy of the exchange 
principle’, itself already ‘become abstract’.44
This problem of money is one Jameson himself 
touches upon in the second half of The Antinomies 
of Realism, in both the chapter on war – where, in 
Doblin’s Wallerstein (1920), money (or ‘wealth’) is, very 
briefly, presented as that ‘conduit’ of ‘the affect that 
pulses’ throughout the text (244–5) – and the chapter 
on ‘providence and realism’, in which the ‘financial 
essence of “providence”’ is traced in Dickens’s Bleak 
House (1852–53) and, particularly, Eliot’s Middlemarch 
(1871–72):
[What] is certainly central in Middlemarch … is the 
‘cash nexus’ and the synchronic role of money in 
the play of these individual destinies (which bear 
the name of a collectivity). The novel is a histori-
cal one, no doubt (set in 1830), and the intensifying 
grip of a money economy over the provinces is one 
ostensible theme the book shares with Balzac. … 
[In] Middlemarch there is no destiny which is not in 
one way or another touched by money. (223–4)
But the argument is not taken any further than this. 
Nor is it related back to the earlier thematics of affect.
Writing in the era in which Middlemarch is set, 
Balzac was working, as Adorno notes, at a moment 
– before the era in which Zola would make the ‘web 
of interconnections’ of the financial system both 
the subject matter and part of the compositional 
logic of novels like The Kill (1871–72) and Money 
(1890–91) – when the ‘norms of homo economicus 
have not yet becomes standardized modes of human 
conduct’, and it was still possible to combine an 
emergent ‘realism’ with forms of romance (not least 
in his representation of the financier or entrepre-
neur). Yet, even here, what Adorno calls Balzac’s own 
‘ardour’ for concreteness already runs up against the 
problem that ‘[i]f the world is to be seen through, 
it can no longer be looked at’. The consequence is 
what Adorno terms a ‘crisis of literary concreteness’ 
itself: ‘Concreteness is the substitute for the real 
experience that is not only almost inevitably lacking 
in the great writers of the industrial age but also 
incommensurable with the age’s own concept.’ This 
is, as he puts it, a ‘realism on the basis of a loss of 
reality’, from which ‘later, in works like Zola’s Ventre 
de Paris, a very modern conclusion is drawn … the 
dissolution of time and action’.45
From this perspective, what Jameson terms invest-
ments in ‘affect’ – and in such ‘dissolution of time 
and action’ – appear precisely as an increasingly 
contradictory attempt to hang on to the concrete 
(or the sensory) in the face of its dissolution as a 
secure marker of ‘reality’. As Adorno puts it, in 
archetypal ‘modernist’ fashion, a certain ‘literary 
realism became obsolete because, as a representation 
of reality, it did not capture reality.’46 Yet, at the same 
time, and only seemingly paradoxically, this ‘crisis of 
literary concreteness’ is also the anxiety of too much 
infinite (because ‘contingent’) detail, and an endless 
exchangeability of ‘concrete’ particulars: the prolif-
eration of the ‘concrete reality’ of those ‘insignificant 
gestures, transitory attitudes, insignificant objects, 
redundant words’ to which Barthes refers in ‘The 
Reality Effect’, and which appear, as Jameson reminds 
us, ‘as a resistance to meaning’.47 Significantly, this is 
precisely Lukács’s critique of Zola, in whose writing, 
he argues, the apparently all-too-concrete descrip-
tive (or affective?) prose of naturalism, and what 
he calls ‘the craze for the fleeting moment’, mask 
a more fundamental abstraction associated, above 
all, with the ‘bad infinite’ of the real abstraction of 
capital itself. The lack of any ‘natural’ or intrinsic 
limit on what the novel might depict or incorporate 
here mirrors a parallel lack with regard to what can 
be concretely exchanged in the universalization of 
the exchange value form.48 One is not required to 
follow Lukács’s own critical judgements on this – 
which depend on his late romantic conception of 
the possibility of a ‘realist’ epic ‘poetry’ in opposition 
to ‘capitalist prose’ – to observe that a good part of 
what he is grappling with here is the ways in which 
capitalist forms come to structure the problem of 
‘reality’ as an object of representation. Think, again, 
of the displays of The Ladies’ Paradise, as well as all 
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those piles of cheese, and, of course, the form of the 
commodity itself: ‘sensuous things which are at the 
same time suprasensible’: sinnlich übersinnliche.49 It 
is, perhaps, as such that the ‘unsolved antagonisms 
of reality’ return to realism as ‘immanent problems 
of form’.50
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